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INTRODUCTION TO NGS SPECIAL ISSUE 
Jackie Leach Scully (Newcastle University) and Robin Williams (Northumbria University) 
The origins of this special issue of New Genetics & Society lie in the response of the editors and a 
number of colleagues to a short exchange that was published in this journal in 2012. The exchange, 
between Hill and Turney (Turney 2010 & 2011; Hill 2011), concerned the role of DNA technology in 
the identification of bodies found following bush fires in the state of Victoria, Australia, in 2009. 
Whilst Hill, writing as a forensic scientist, was concerned to explain the logic of the scientific and 
operational procedures that comprise DNA identification in situations of mass disasters, Turney’s 
sociological perspective was focussed on families’ needs and sentiments as the dominant frame of 
reference for the analysis of the promises, constraints and accomplishments of forensic genetics in 
efforts to identify individuals caught up in such catastrophic events. 
This rather confrontational exchange raised interesting issues about the relationship between the 
techno-scientific practice of forensic DNA identification, criminal justice and other state actors 
involved in disaster response efforts expectations, victims’ families and friends’ understandings and 
requirements, the mass media’s role in the reporting of mass disaster incidents, and public 
perceptions of forensic science, especially forensic genetics. However, to adequately resolve the 
disciplinary and political differences exposed in the Hill-Turney exchange requires more detailed 
consideration of how the actions of those involved in mass disasters (especially as responders, 
witnesses, or relatives) shape, and are shaped by, various epistemic, organisational, political, and 
socio-ethical resources implicated in the use of forensic genetics to identify those who lose their 
lives in such events. Disaster victim identification (DVI) by DNA touches on many areas of profound 
significance to contemporary global societies, including: the contemporary authority of science and 
technology; beliefs and practices to do with death, burial, mourning, the body and body parts; 
notions of kinship, citizenship, community and continuity; as well as areas of more specialized social 
and legal interest such as inheritance, professionalisation and training in an emerging discipline, and 
cross-border jurisdictions.  
The comparative novelty of DVI by DNA means that the social, ethical and legal issues associated 
with it remain significantly under-analysed. Research within the field has largely focused on the 
practical priorities of optimizing the technology, and developing the most effective, internationally 
portable set of identification procedures. There are many handbooks of ‘good practice’ in disaster 
victim identification (e.g. National Institute of Justice, 2006; INTERPOL, 2009; ICRC, 2007). There are 
reference texts for working scientists (e.g. Black et al., 2010; Moore, 2006; Khardori, 2006) along 
with major reviews of current practice (e.g. Prinz et al. 2006), and special journal issues on particular 
DVI events (e.g. Thompson and Evison, 2003; Drummer and Cordner, 2011). Nevertheless, little 
attention has yet been paid to examining the broader issues associated with the use of DNA as a 
means of identifying remains in both contemporary and historical mass fatalities, although there is 
an emerging body of social science studies of DVI (e.g. Klinenberg, 2001; Petrović-Śteger , 2009; 
Wagner, 2008), critical analyses of the role of forensic genetics in closely related contexts (e.g. 
Williams & Johnson 2008), and socio-political reflections on state identification imperatives and their 
enactment (e.g. Edkins, 2011).  
The authority of DNA identification and its uses in mass disaster situations remains intimately 
connected to medicine and the work of medical professionals. First, this is because of the need to 
match unknown samples with DNA from possible family members, from fortuitously held medical 
samples, or with medical records. Second, it is because, in most western countries, unidentified 
human remains fall under the medical examiner or coroner’s legal jurisdiction until released for 
burial. Yet using DNA technology in DVI also involves diverse nonmedical actors, ranging from the 
professional (e.g. forensic services, police, military), to the pastoral (e.g. family liaison services, 
religious representatives), to surviving family members. In today’s highly mobile world, DVI by DNA 
also often involves the retrieval of medical and other information from multiple locations, each with 
potentially distinctive cultural and legal traditions.  
Many of these matters, as well as those mentioned earlier in this introduction, were discussed in a 
workshop funded by the Brocher Foundation, Naming the dead: social, ethical, legal and political 
issues of disaster victim identification by DNA, which was held in Geneva 4-7 December 2012, The 
meeting attracted expert practitioners and academics, including representatives of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, the International Commission on Missing Persons, UK National Police 
Family Liaison and others, in a ground-breaking cross-disciplinary event. This issue of New Genetics 
& Society is made up of papers selected from those given in the Brocher workshop.   
Bodies, as Caroline Bennett notes, are inherently political and our treatment of them reveals societal 
ideologies and moral norms. The increasingly global nature of both disasters and disaster responses 
means that post-disaster identification now frequently takes place in situations where practitioners 
may be unfamiliar both with the prevailing ideologies and the moral norms of victims, communities 
and families. Drawing on fieldwork as a forensic scientist in Iraq and as an ethnologist in Cambodia, 
Bennett questions the assumption that DNA analysis is a universally appropriate tool in DVI. She 
argues that, although the Western media and public view DNA analysis as the ultimate provider of 
‘true’ identity, this reflects a highly localised, Western scientific understanding of where identity is 
situated and how it relates to the physical remains of each individual, an understanding that may 
conflict with local socio-cultural beliefs and norms. The use of DVI by DNA may be less relevant, or 
even repugnant, to cultures with notions of identity that are not biologically based, or where the 
physical remains of a person are relatively unimportant to their memorialisation or social presence 
after death. Moreover, as a sophisticated and prestigious technology, the use of DNA-based DVI may 
be driven less by humanitarian motives and more by the political and social capital that it can give to 
individuals, organizations, and governments, and the opportunities it offers to exert control over 
local populations and claim a place within the global community. These considerations challenge us 
to look again at the routinisation of DVI by DNA and to consider whether and when other routes to 
identification may be more culturally acceptable. 
Papers by Williams & Wienroth and Haimes & Toom examine, at different levels of granularity, the 
ways in which developments in DNA technology have meant that they have become increasing 
central to DVI efforts. These papers also consider how such developments are related to wider 
epistemic, organisational and social concerns about identity and identification in modernity, as well 
as how the credibility of genetic knowledge is used to reduce uncertainty in a variety of legal 
deliberations.  Williams & Wienroth offer an account of the overall role of DNA profiling and 
matching in the contemporary ‘biometric regime of identification’, noting that this regime is 
increasingly extended to the authoritative identification of the dead as well as to the living. 
Focussing on the place of forensic genetics in the development of an increasingly complex and cross-
national disaster response apparatus, they borrow existing concepts used to describe the 
trajectories of technology adoption in medical contexts to illuminate how and why the geneticization 
of DVI has become so easily normalised. Finally they use this history to reflect on the mutuality of 
the practical application of genetic technologies of identification on the one hand and longstanding 
philosophical assertions of the essentials of identity on the other.  
Haimes &Toom provide a nuanced account of  how ‘social relatedness’ is constituted in and through 
the technical and legal work that makes up authoritative disaster (or atrocity) victim identification as 
well as the ways in which such biolegal determinations may be supported or interfered with by 
understandings of kinship, genetics, identity, and obligation that circulate more widely within 
particular social configurations. This general exploration is given a sharp focus through a detailed 
examination of a conspicuous instance of the use of DNA for atrocity victim identification - the trial 
of Radovan Karadžić at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia -- and, in 
particular, an analysis of the judicial ruling that responded to Karadžić’s request to access the DNA 
database used in the identification of victims, cited in the charges laid against him. Through the 
analysis of a single document, Haimes and Toom make visible a series of absences and silent 
assumptions concerning kinship that serve to support the authority of the legal ruling. Their study 
also shows how such an examination of taken-for-granted assumptions about the connections 
between genetics and kinship throw into relief the many complexities that inevitably arise when the 
law, scientific knowledge and the quotidian are brought together in practical undertakings, as well as 
the resources that are used to reduce these complexities in any particular instance.   
Two further papers address, in different ways, the same example of historical identification: the 
recent excavation of the remains of 250 Australian soldiers dating from World War I from mass 
graves in Fromelles, northern France, and the project that attempted to identify them by name 
through DNA matching with their descendants. Margaret Cox and Peter Jones write from the 
perspectives of a forensic anthropologist and a molecular biologist respectively. They give an 
account of how the Fromelles Project was devised and progressed and, as practitioners directly 
involved in the Project, provide a unique insight into the ethical issues and debates that were 
encountered as the Project developed. Some of these, such as obtaining proper informed consent 
from donors of DNA, are shared with many other biotechnological areas. As the Fromelles Project 
was the first of its kind, however, other areas were more novel, such as questions about the ethically 
and socially appropriate terminology to use for the dead, or how to manage the media-driven 
expectations that family members had about DNA-based identifications. As we noted earlier, there 
has so far been relatively little examination of the social and ethical aspects of DVI by DNA, and this 
underscores the importance of taking note of the experience and perspectives of those 
professionally involved. This ensures that the social and bioethical analysis remains grounded in the 
practical realities of DVI work and, equally importantly, can contribute to strengthening its ethical 
framework for the future. 
Scully’s paper also examines the Fromelles identification project, but this time using an empirical 
approach to explore in detail how living family members experience some of the ethical issues 
involved. Drawing on a pilot study examining why family members chose to provide DNA samples (or 
not), her analysis suggests that volunteering DNA for identification purposes can be understood as 
an act of care directed variously at the dead soldier, at other family members, at the family as a 
whole, or even at the donor her or himself. By placing historical DVI by DNA within the context of 
care, Scully is able then to analyse it within the framework of the ethics of care, and in doing so 
identify some distinctive normative issues. Although historical identifications, like the one 
undertaken for the dead of Fromelles, might be considered marginal within the wider context of DVI 
by DNA, Scully argues that precisely because some of the more urgent rationales for identification 
are lacking, these cases reveal more subtle aspects of the practice, such as the vulnerabilities of the 
families and communities to the power of social, political and epistemic power of external 
authorities. These issues may have relevance beyond historical identifications to mass fatality 
identification as a whole.  
Finally, Woods’ paper turns away from the scientific and organisational particularities of DNA 
identification practices in order to consider the grounds of some of the normative preoccupations 
which underpin the willingness of state and other national and international agencies to invest 
significant amounts of economic, human and scientific capital into the identification of victims as a 
necessary feature of mass disaster response. Arguing that the ‘underlying ethics of disaster 
management’ are best interrogated by consideration of three basis propositions (that ‘the dead 
matter’, that ‘the body matters,’ and that caring for the dead and caring for the living are ‘intimately 
connected’), Woods deploys a range of anthropological and philosophical resources to support a 
critique of the currently influential, rationalised and professionalised ‘Epicurian model of bioethics’. 
S/he argues for its replacement by an ‘ethics of care’ within which we can evaluate the moral 
propriety along with the technical effectiveness of the ways in which disaster victim identification is 
carried out in contemporary society. 
The six papers in this special issue draw on a variety of disciplinary resources –including philosophy, 
anthropology, science and technology studies, and sociology – as well as the experience of practical 
involvement, in order to explore how DNA profiling and matching technologies have now become a 
routine resource in the efforts to restore social order following both natural and anthropogenically 
occasioned disasters and atrocities. They highlight the ways in which such innovations utilise, modify 
and disrupt a range of epistemic, practical and moral preferences about individual and social bodies 
and their relationship to each another. Some authors seek to integrate empirical inquiry with 
normative reflection, but none have offered prescriptive conclusions.  Indeed, each of them 
underlines the dangers of premature foreclosure of genuine inquiry into the consequences of a 
practice that is increasingly presented as routine and unproblematic. Instead, they aim to encourage 
and support the ongoing conversations between those with direct experience of DVI by DNA – 
practitioners of different kinds, designers of policy and regulations, and the families and 
communities affected by mass fatalities – and those ethicists, philosophers, anthropologists and 
sociologists who bring their disciplinary skills to the task of studying the practice. As authors and 
guest editors, we hope that this special issue serves to stimulate further critical engagement with 
the ethical and social issues raised by the use of DNA-based technologies in DVI and elsewhere. 
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